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PA R T I

INTRODUCTION

Discussions about monetary policy rules since Taylor’s (1993) pioneering
work have more or less revolved around what has generally been known as the Taylor
rule. The Taylor rule models the Fed Funds rate as a function o f the deviation o f
inflation from a target rate and the deviation o f real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
from potential real GDP (that is, its long-run sustainable trend). The rule assumes that
policymakers seek to stabilize output and prices about paths that are thought to be
optimal and they do so by changing the interest rate target, the nominal Fed Funds
rate. If inflation is above the target, the Fed responds by raising rates to prevent
inflationary pressures in the economy, and if inflation is below target it eases policy.
The output gap is also a measure o f inflationary pressures in essence. If real GDP is
above its potential, the Fed tightens policy and vice-versa.
Taylor (1993) argues that this simple rule is a good representation o f how the
Fed sets its policy instrument. However, critics have shown that the so-called Taylor
rule misses out on the inertial behavior o f the Fed and this has led to an enormous
literature on optimal policy rules as opposed to simple policy rules (Giannoni and
Woodford, 2001). Yet, among the class o f optimal policy rules, there is a division
about how these rules are specified and what characteristics are embedded in them.
Some argue that Taylor-type policy rules are forward-looking while others maintain

1
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that they are backward-looking. Such debates invariably mean that a huge class o f
Taylor rules has emerged over time in the search for the one rule that most
appropriately describes the Fed Funds rate behavior. Moreover, concerns about asset
prices have altogether rendered policy rules more complex. This study presents three
essays to address three key challenges that face monetary policymakers today.
The first essay examines whether Taylor-type monetary policy rules are
forward-looking. Most o f the studies in the literature use statistical break tests to
analyze the parameter stability o f Taylor rules. However, parameter stability is only
one aspect o f forward-lookingness; another is the structural invariance o f the
parameters. This study attempts to fill in this gap in the literature by exploring the
superexogeneity test o f Engle and Hendry (1993) and invoking the Lucas (1976)
critique. The hypothesis that we want to empirically test is that inflation is
superexogenous for the parameters o f the Taylor rule. While weak exogeneity is
sufficient for forecasting analysis, superexogeneity is required for policy analysis. The
methodology adopted is that if the parameters o f the Taylor-type rule change when the
mechanism generating inflation changes, that is the Lucas critique applies, then
inflation is not superexogenous for the parameters o f the Taylor rule. The rationale o f
this is that we want to investigate whether monetary policymakers can change the
process that determines inflation without affecting the process that determines the Fed
Funds rate. To account for the structural break in the marginal model (Phillips curve)
this study uses a heteroskedastic variance model that allows for discrete regime shifts
in the volatility o f inflation. The a priori belief is that if the Lucas critique holds, then
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structural breaks in the inflation process should cause the parameters o f the Taylor
rule to change thus resulting in a forward-looking behavior o f the Taylor rule.
In the second essay, we focus on the issue o f whether Taylor-based monetary
policy rules are encompassing which is one aspect o f data congruency. That is, we
want to investigate which policy rule among existing rival ones most appropriately
describes the Fed Funds rate data generating process. Since Taylor’s (1993) rule,
several rival models o f the Fed Funds rate have emerged in an attempt to explain the
Fed Funds rate behavior. However, although there seems to be less disagreement on
the general functional form o f Taylor-type rules, there is no consensus on rule
specifics. Which measures o f inflation and output gaps to use in Taylor-type rules
have not been given adequate formal treatment and the use of the wrong measures can
result in policy mistakes. The different measures o f inflation and output gaps
essentially differ based on the underlying inflation and potential output variables used.
To this effect, the question o f which inflation variable policymakers should attempt to
stabilize may not be as simple as it seems because the level and direction o f inflation
movements differ for different measures o f inflation and justifying a given choice
measure may prove difficult. Similarly, which potential output measure to use may
not be a trivial issue. This study attempts to solve this debate by focusing on a class o f
Taylor-type rules that are non-nested in the sense that they cannot be expressed as a
restricted version o f one another; that is, in essence they are rivals to one another. To
do the analysis, it employs the encompassing principle o f Hendry (1985), the
multivariate non-nested P test o f Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) and the serial
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correlation extension o f the non-nested P test proposed by McAleer, Pesaran and Bera
(1990). Five inflation and four output gap measures are used and 116 non-nested P
tests are performed to examine which interest rate model encompasses competing
alternatives. The study unambiguously comes up with one single measure o f inflation
and output gap that best describe the Fed Funds rate data generating process.
The third essay augments the model from the second essay to investigate one
issue that has been o f great concern to monetary policymakers since the stock market
rally of the early 1980s, namely, whether policy rules are asset price responsive. The
importance o f this issue is that if asset prices contain vital information about the
economy then the question is: Does the Fed react to asset prices while designing
monetary policy? In particular, this study examines if it does, then to which
component does it respond? To address such issues in the literature, most studies have
simply concentrated on a direct measure o f asset prices. However, this study uses a
non-linear model o f intrinsic bubbles to decompose stock prices into market
fundamentals and stock price bubbles. Moreover, it employs an Exponential
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Hetereoskedastic (E-GARCH) model to
gauge volatility clustering and leverage effects inherent in equity returns. These
constructed measures o f asset price bubbles, market fundamentals and uncertaintycreating volatility are then used as additional indicators in the Fed’s reaction function.
To substantiate the results, it also uses a direct measure o f productivity to proxy for
market fundamentals.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The study o f Taylor rules is not novel. However, there are five contributions
of this study that can be considered new:
1. No study, to the extent o f our knowledge, has investigated the forwardlookingness o f Taylor-based monetary policy rules using formal superexogeneity tests
and focusing on structural invariance considerations.
2. This study models the structural break in the volatility o f inflation using a
hetereoskedastic variance model that allows for discrete regime shifts.
3. The analysis o f the data congruency o f Taylor rules using non-nested tests
and the encompassing principle is novel.
4. This study identifies the one measure o f inflation and output gap that is
most consistent with the Fed Funds rate behavior and also shows that other rival
models fail to appropriately characterize the interest rate data generating process.
5. This study analyzes which specific components o f the stock market the Fed
responds to if it does respond. Estimating and incorporating the conditional variance
from an E-GARCH model, and a measure o f intrinsic bubbles and stock market
fundamentals into the Taylor rule is a new contribution as this helps in determining
whether there is any response o f the Fed to stock market uncertainty, irrational
exuberance and productivity growth respectively.
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PART II

ARE TAYLOR-BASED MONETARY POLICY RULES FORWARD-LOOKING?
AN INVESTIGATION USING SUPEREXOGENEITY TESTS

Introduction

One o f the key challenges that face U.S. monetary policymakers is whether
monetary policy rules o f the Taylor (1993) type are forward-looking or backwardlooking. The basic structure o f the Taylor-type policy rule models the short interest
rate (the Federal Funds rate) as a function o f the inflation gap, the output gap and an
interest rate smoothing component. The general notion in the literature is that a
variable is forward-looking if it depends on expectations o f future variables. Svensson
(2003) notes that, formally, a variable is forward-looking if it depends on expectations
o f future variables and has endogenous one-period-ahead forecast errors. Conversely,
a variable is backward-looking if it depends on its past values. An extension o f this
idea to monetary policy rules would then suggest that interest rate rules are forWardlooking if they contain some measures o f expected inflation and/or output gap, and
backward-looking if the indicator variables enter as lagged representations. However,
this paper argues that a more formal test is needed before we can conclude whether a
rule feeds forward or backward.
The type o f tests that this paper deals with invokes the Lucas (1976) critique
and the superexogeneity test o f Engle and Hendry (1993). According to the Lucas

6
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critique, changes in policy affect the behavior o f rational agents and such behavioral
changes can invalidate the model relationships estimated under the previous policy
regime. In other words, shifts in economic policy change how policy affects the
economy because agents in the economy are forward- rather than backward-looking
and adapt their expectations and behavior to the new policy stance (Linde, 2001).
Empirical studies o f monetary policy rules suggest that the behavior o f the U.S.
monetary policymakers changed during the past few decades (Judd and Rudebusch
(1998), Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and Estrella and Fuhrer
(2000)). These studies found that the parameters o f the rules are not stable. This
evidence would suggest that the Lucas critique holds. However, at the same time,
models with lagged representations o f the economy such as Vector Autoregressions
(VARs) often did not exhibit any structural instability (Bemanke and Mihov (1998),
Estrella and Fuhrer (2000), Leeper and Zha (2001)). Recognizing that these two sets
o f empirical results appear to contradict the Lucas critique, Rudebusch (2003)
attempts to reconcile this discrepancy by showing that the apparent policy invariance
o f reduced form models like the VARs is consistent with the magnitude o f historical
policy shifts and the relative insensitivity o f the reduced forms o f forward-looking
models.
However, the issue o f forward-lookingness still remains unsettled. Studies that
investigate the forward- or backward-lookingness o f reaction functions derive their
conclusions based solely on statistical break or stability tests o f the Chow type,
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test o f Andrews and Fair (1988), predictive test (TS) o f
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Ghysels and Hall (1990), or multiple unknown breakpoints test o f Bai (1999). Using
these kinds o f stability tests and simulation techniques, Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) and
Rudebusch (2003) find that the magnitude o f the Lucas effect - the reaction o f agents’
behavioral equations to structural changes in policy - has not been very large in
practice. To help solve the divergence o f views on the forward- versus backwardlookingness o f policy rules this paper proposes a methodology using superexogeneity
tests. The methodology is to test whether the target variable, say, inflation, is
superexogenous to the parameters o f the Taylor-type rule. If, when the mechanism
generating inflation changes, the parameters o f the Taylor-type rule change - that is
the Lucas critique applies - then inflation is not superexogenous for the parameters o f
the Taylor rule. In this case where superexogeneity fails, the rule is forward-looking.
The implication o f this is that the Fed cannot change the process that determines
inflation without affecting the process that determines the Federal Funds rate.
Interestingly, the results show that the null that inflation is superexogenous to
the parameters o f the Taylor rule cannot be rejected over the 1983Q1 to 2002Q2
period. This suggests that there is no sufficient evidence to reject the claim the Taylor
rules are not forward-looking.

The Superexogeneity Test Methodology

In the literature, the practical application o f the superexogeneity tests is due to
Engle and Hendry (1993). Other studies such as Caporale (1996), Darrat et al (1998)
and Perez (2000) are simplified versions o f it. Engle and Hendry (1993) describe a
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testing methodology based on the superexogeneity concept o f Engle, Hendry and
Richard (1983). This requires the specification o f the conditional and marginal
distributions o f the variables o f interest. In terms o f our Taylor-type monetary policy
rule the immediate variables o f interest are the Fed Funds rate and the inflation gap.
The inflation gap, n t , is measured as the deviation o f inflation from a 2 percent
target level. Inflation is calculated following the standard procedure in the Taylor rule
literature, that is, the percentage change in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price
deflator over the previous four quarters. Then the joint distribution o f the Federal
Funds rate, rt, and the inflation gap, n t , can be written as:
(1)

Dj(rt, n t | Ft; At) = Dc(rt | n t , Ft; Am) DM( n t | Ft; X2t)

where Dj, Dc, and Dm denote the joint density, the conditional density o f rt given
n t , and the marginal density o f ;r( , respectively, and At, Ait, and X2x, the
corresponding parameters. Ft represents the field o f information including past values
o f rt and n t as well as current and past values o f other valid conditioning variables.
By Engle and Hendry (1993), n t would be defined as being superexogenous for 0 (a
set of parameters o f interest) if n t is weakly exogenous for 0 and Ai is invariant to
changes in X2 (i.e. changes in X2 do not imply changes in Ai). n t is defined as weakly
exogenous for 0 if 0 is a function o f the parameters An alone, and Ait and X2x are
variation-free (that is, over periods o f constant X2x there is no information in X2 that
would help estimating Ai (Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983)). The important

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

distinction between weak and superexogeneity is that weak exogeneity is sufficient
for the conditional model to be used in forecasting analysis, whereas policy analysis
requires superexogeneity. Pearl (2000) notes that superexogeneity (or what she calls
exogeneity) is a notion that captures economists’ interest in the structural invariance
o f certain relationships under policy intervention.
The conditional distribution o f the Fed Funds rate is in fact an augmented
Taylor rule which can be specified as follows:

(2)

rt = 7t.B + z ' y + u.

=

+ Yort + K + r 2y, + «,
- 1

where z t represents the vector o f all other conditioning variables like the lagged Fed
Funds rate, rt.i; and the output gap, yt. The output gap is measured as the percentage
deviation o f real Gross Domestic Product from real potential GDP as calculated by
the Congressional Budget Office. P and y are the parameters o f the model. This
augmented Taylor rule is quite standard in the literature (see Taylor (1999), Kozicki
(1999), Woodford (1994, 1999, 2001)). ut is the error term that follows a stationary
AR(1) process:
(3)

ut = p 0utA + vt , vt ~ N ID (0 ,a 2), \ p 0 |< 1.

To test the null hypothesis that the inflation gap n t is superexogenous for p, we first
need to specify the marginal distribution o f n t . Suppose there is a set o f instruments
Zt, including zt, which describes the mean o f n t through:
(4)

n t = Z > + /7,
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The construction o f Zt is assumed to allow for and define regime shifts in the data
generating process o f n t . This specification gives wide scope to specifying changes
in policy regime, expectations formation, or states o f nature. Essentially equation (4)
represents a Phillips curve with the vector Zt containing the inflation and output gaps.
\|/ represents the parameters o f the marginal distribution and rjt denotes the error
term.
Following Engle and Hendry (1993), the superexogeneity test can be
formulated based on the following regression:
(5)

rt = 7r,/?0 + z'ty + (S0 - p {))rjt + dxa 2ti)t + P xn ] + /?2cr,2 + f c n ta ] + e,

where

cr2 is the conditional variance o f rjr

This specification allows for

heteroskedasticity in the error term o f (4). Then to test the null hypothesis that the
inflation gap, n t , is superexogenous for /?0, we perform the following joint test:

(6)

H 0 :<f>\ = 5 X = p x = P 2 = A = 0

where <f>x = S 0 ~ P 0 .

Estimation Results

This section presents the estimated Phillips curve (marginal model) and the
results of the superexogeneity test.

Phillips Curve Marginal Equation

Different studies in the literature provide different specifications o f the
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Phillips curve. Some are what is referred to as forward-looking (Roberts (1995),
McCallum and Nelson (1999), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), and Svensson
(2003)), and some with inflation inertia (Bomfim and Diebold (1997) and Razzak
(2002)). However, some studies such as Fuhrer (1997), Fair (1993), Chadha et al
(1992), Roberts (1995, 2001), Laxton et al (1998), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999),
Rudebusch (2001), and Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) argue that there is some evidence
that expectations in Phillips curve are backward-looking. Our estimation results seem
to support the specification o f Phillips curve that has a lagged representation o f
inflation and output gap:
(4 ’)

Kt = 1-2537rM “ 0<277n t_2 + 0.030^m + r]t
(11.39) (-2.48)
(1.81)
R2=0.93, LM=0.27 [p-value=0.87]
'j

where the numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics, R

is the coefficient of

determination and LM is the Lagrange-Multiplier test for serial correlation. This result
is consistent with the findings in the literature: there is a great deal o f inertia in the
inflation process while the output gap is mildly important. While there is no serial
correlation in the residuals, we model below the possibility o f heteroskedasticity.
Since the construction o f Zt in (4) is assumed to allow for and define regime
shifts in the data generating process o f n t , we perform a series o f Chow breakpoint
and dummy variable tests for specific dates where we believe a priori (based on
underlying economic reasons) that there could be a certain structural change in the
inflation process. For instance, Chairman Greenspan is believed to have been
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successful in controlling inflation. So, we carried out a Chow breakpoint test for
1987Q2 to allow for any regime shift that could possibly exist when Greenspan was
appointed. Such a point was also identified by Estrella and Fuhrer (2003). However,
the test turns out to be insignificant with an F statistic o f 1.12 [p-value=0.35]. Similar
tests for the 1987 stock market crash, the 1990 S&L and Persian G ulf crises, the 1994
Mexican Peso crisis, the 1997 Pacific Rim crisis and the 1998 Russian Default crisis
fail to identify any structural break. However, the Chow breakpoint test captured the
2001 recession, the F statistic being 4.48 [p-value=0.01]. In fact, in 2001, inflation
was higher than in the surrounding years. To account for the period o f high
productivity growth in the mid to late 1990s, where inflation declined substantially,
dummy variables were included; however, they turned out to be insignificant. Overall,
Chow breakpoint and dummy variable tests do not seem to suggest that there is a
structural break in the inflation process.
However, a closer look at the inflation data in Figure 1 suggests that the
volatility o f inflation has indeed changed over the sample period. After the 1991
recession, it appears that there has been less variability in inflation (shaded area).
Although the residuals (measured on the left scale) from the estimated Phillips curve
are within the 2 standard error bounds (dotted straight lines) except for just a couple
o f years, they tend to be more erratic before 1990-1991 than afterwards. A check on
the recursive residuals in the spirit o f Hendry (1988) was also done and it also
suggests the same.
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Figure 1. Inflation Gap: Actual, Fitted and Residuals

To model for the different regimes o f inflation volatility, we allow the
variance o f the error term rjt in (4) to follow a discrete heteroskedastic process as
follows:
(7)

V(Tjl ) = a 0 + a ld,

where d t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 1991Q1 onwards and 0 prior to 1991.
Using the estimates a 0 and a x we then construct the following conditional variance
series for rjt :
(j(2 = 0.068 —0.035dt

(0.01) (0.01)
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The numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. The coefficient o f the dummy
variable, being significant and negative and almost half o f the intercept term, implies
that the variability in the inflation process almost halved for the post-1991 period.
Indeed, the 1990s were a period o f sustained productivity growth, stock market
optimism and confidence, and a hawkish Fed whose primary objective was to
maintain price stability. Hence, a reduction in inflation uncertainty seems to be a
verified empirical fact.

Conditional Taylor Rule and Superexogeneitv Tests

Using o f and n t we construct n t a ] and estimate the model given in (5).
The results are as follows:
r, =2.199 + 0 .6 0 0 ^ + 0.346y, + 0.426rM +0.897/7, -14.484ct,2»7,
(2.12) (1.06)

(3.46)

(3.41)

(1.47)

(-1.21)

(9)
- 0.092/r,2 +17.243af + 5.296/r,c72
(-0.67)

(0.74)

(0.44)

Numbers in parentheses represent t-statistics. Several results fall out from (9).
First, as Engle and Hendry (1993) points out, the weak exogeneity o f n t for /30 in (5)
entails a zero effect from fjt . The insignificance o f the coefficient o f fjt as shown in
(9) implies that the inflation gap is indeed weakly exogenous for /?0. Second,
constancy of dx entails Sx - 0 . Indeed, the result in (9) indicates that the coefficient
o f <y]f\t is not significantly different from zero (t-statistic being -1.21). Third, the
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invariance o f /? in (2) entails that A = A - A - 0 • A joint test produces an Fstatistic o f 1.93 [p-value=0.133] suggesting that (5 is invariant. Finally, the joint test
that H 0 \<f>x - 8X = A = A - A = 0 produces an F-statistic o f 1.53 [p-value=0.192],
indicating that we cannot reject the null that the inflation gap is superexogenous for
the parameters o f the Taylor rule. This means that there is not sufficient evidence to
reject the hypothesis that the Lucas critique fails and the claim that Taylor rules are
not forward-looking. Estrella and Fuhrer (2003) showed, through a set o f stability
tests, that backward-looking reaction functions are more stable and do not undergo
parameter instability when policy changes.

Conclusion

This study has examined an important policy question, namely whether
Taylor-based monetary policy rules are forward-looking. Studies that investigate the
forward- or backward-lookingness o f reaction functions derive their conclusions
based solely on statistical break tests. This study, on the other hand, proposes a simple
test of forward-lookingness in policy rules by appealing to the Lucas critique and the
superexogeneity test o f Engle and Hendry (1993). The methodology adopted is that if
the parameters o f the Taylor-type rule change when the mechanism generating
inflation changes, that is the Lucas critique applies, then inflation is not
superexogenous for the parameters o f the Taylor rule. In this case where
superexogeneity fails, the rule is forward-looking.
To conduct the analysis this study first estimates a Phillips curve o f the form
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that is well established in the literature. Then it carries out a set o f structural break
tests to identify possible regime shifts. The structural break in the inflation process
was best captured by a discrete heteroskedastic variance model which explains the
volatility of inflation. However, although the results indicate that the volatility of
inflation reduced by almost 50 percent over the second half o f the sample period, we
fail to reject the null that inflation is superexogenous to the parameters o f the Taylor
rule. There is also no sufficient evidence to reject weak exogeneity, parameter
constancy and structural invariance. Overall, the results suggest that we cannot reject
the claim that Taylor-based rules are not forward-looking. Because o f the lack of
power o f superexogeneity tests, the next chapter uses a more direct methodology to
identify the measures o f inflation and output gap that most appropriately characterize
the interest rate data generating process.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PART III

ARE TAYLOR-BASED MONETARY POLICY RULES ENCOMPASSING?
A NON-NESTED TESTS APPROACH

Introduction

Taylor’s (1993) study on monetary policy rules has been the most influential
pioneer work on the determinants o f the Federal Funds rate behavior. In response to
Taylor, a huge amount of theoretical and empirical literature on policy rules and Fed
reaction functions has emerged with the objective o f building model that correctly
explains the Fed Funds rate behavior. Rule specifications have varied in general
functional form as well as in specifics to produce a class of rules that could be best
labeled as Taylor-type rules. Although there seems to be less disagreement on the
general functional form o f Taylor-type rules, there is no consensus on rule specifics.
Which measures o f inflation and output gaps to use in Taylor-type rules have not been
given adequate formal thoughts.
The different measures o f inflation and output gaps essentially differ based on
the underlying inflation and potential output variables used. To this effect, the
question o f which inflation variable policymakers should attempt to stabilize may not
be as simple as it seems because the level and direction o f inflation movements differ
for different measures o f inflation and justifying a given choice measure may prove
difficult. Similarly, which potential output measure to use may not be a trivial issue.
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Kozicki (1999) argues that to be useful to policymakers, rule recommendations
should be robust to minor variations in the rule specification. She explains that if, for
instance, recommendations differ considerably depending on whether price inflation
is measured using the core consumer price index or the GDP deflator, then the rule
may not be very useful. Similarly, Kuttner (1992) comments that uncertainty in
estimates o f the output gap may mean that situations requiring policy action may not
be recognizable until later on.
Different studies have used different measures o f inflation and output gaps in
trying to explain the Fed Funds behavior. In his work, Taylor (1993) uses the GDP
deflator measure o f inflation. This measure has been widely used in the literature on
Taylor rules (see for instance, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), Woodford (2001),
Rigobon and Sack (2001)). Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) also use the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) inflation measure, and so do Filardo (2000) and Bemanke and
Gertler (2001). Some studies such as Filardo (2000) use the core CPI while some
others like Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) use the commodity price inflation.
Goodhart (2000) has recommended that central banks should replace conventional
inflation measures such as the CPI or personal consumption expenditure price index
with a broader measure that includes housing and stock market prices in order to
improve macroeconomic performance. To account for the forward-looking behavior
o f rules, Kozicki (1999) uses the University o f Michigan expected inflation measure
and the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure.
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As far as the output gap is concerned, some studies use the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) measure. These include Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000),
Rigobon and Sack (2001) amongst others. Taylor (1993) himself used an output gap
based on a linear time trend real GDP. More recently, Taylor (1999) uses the HodrickPrescott filter trend measure to calculate the output gap. De Masi (1997) from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides a measure o f potential output based on a
segmented trend approach and Kozicki (1999) uses this IMF measure together with
other measures to examine policy rules. Woodford (2001) argues that real unit labor
cost is a much better measure o f the true output gap for purposes o f explaining
inflation variation, but he also points out that such a measure would have practical
implementation problems in a Taylor rule framework.
Employing five commonly used measures o f inflation and four commonly
used measures o f the output gap, we have plotted the range o f the

20

rule

recommendations (the Fed’s ex-ante Fed Funds rate) in Figure 2 during the 1983Q1 to
2002Q2 period. The dashed lines reflect the range o f rule recommendations based on
recommendations calculated for each o f the five measures o f inflation and each o f the
four measures o f output gap. In each quarter, the maximum o f the range corresponds
to the maximum o f the

20

rule recommendations, and the minimum o f the range

corresponds to the minimum o f the 20 rule recommendations. The average range is
1.64 percentage points. However, the range fluctuates considerably, reaching its
narrowest at 0.65 percentage point in 1997Q1 and reaching its widest at 4.19
percentage points in 1983Q1. There are also periods, for instance the earlyl980s, mid-
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1990s and 2001 onwards, where the actual Fed Funds rate value has been totally
outside the range o f rule recommendations.

Percent
Fed Funds rate
10

-

6

-

4

-

Figure 2. The Range o f Taylor-Type Rule Recommendations for the Fed Funds Rate

Overall, the range shows how erratic the rule recommendations are with
respect to the actual Fed Funds rate behavior. Indeed, in the literature there has been
no basis to choose the correct inflation and output gap measures that enter the policy
rule.
In this paper we conduct a series of formal tests to pin down the measures of
inflation and output gaps that are congruent with the Fed Funds rate data generating,
process over the 1983Q1 to 2002Q2 period. We focus on a class o f non-nested
Taylor-type rules and employ the encompassing principle to show that the measures
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o f inflation and output gap that are consistent with the Fed Funds rate behavior are the
Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation as calculated by the Survey of
Professional Forecasters and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) measure o f
output gap. Taylor rules based on these measures o f inflation and output gaps alone
are encompassing.

Taylor Rules and the Non-Nested Test Methodology

Since the aim of this study is concerned with the specifics o f the Taylor-type
rule - and not its general functional form - we therefore start by assuming a standard
augmented Taylor rule o f the form that is commonly accepted in the literature. Such a
generic widely accepted monetary policy Taylor-type rule can be described as
(10)

rt = /V m + A + P in t + P t ft + ut

where rt represents the nominal Fed Funds rate at time t, n represents the inflation
gap measured as the deviation o f inflation from a

2

percent target level, y is the

output gap measured as the percentage deviation o f real GDP from potential real
GDP, and u is the error term that follows a stationary AR(1) process:
(11)

ut = p 0ut_} +£,, e, ~ N I D ( 0 ,a 2), |p 0 | < l .
Equation (10) is an augmented Taylor rule because it comprises the lagged

interest rate. Taylor’s (1993) rule omits the interest rate smoothing parameter.
Rudebusch (2002) argues that the lagged interest rate is not a fundamental component
o f the U.S. policy rule, and that its significance arises from the omission o f serially
correlated variables from the policy rule. By contrast, English, Nelson and Sack
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(2 0 0 2 ) find that while serially correlated omitted variables may be present, the lagged
interest rate enters the policy rule in its own right and plays an important role in
describing the behavior o f the Fed Funds rate. In the literature, many analysts have
noted that the Fed has a tendency to smooth movements o f the Funds rate
(Goodfriend (1991), Orphanides (1997), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)).
The constant term /?, subsumes the equilibrium real interest rate and the
inflation target and it provides a benchmark recommendation for the nominal Fed
Funds rate. The inflation gap adjustment factor

/? 2

recommends raising the Fed Funds

rate above the benchmark if inflation is above the target for inflation and lowering the
Fed Funds rate below the benchmark if inflation is below the target. Some analysts
argue that the output gap adjustment factor,/?3, brings a forward-looking, or
preemptive, motive to policy recommendations. In this view, a positive output gap
signals likely future increases in inflation and therefore an increase in the Fed Funds
rate.
The focus of this study is to discover which are the correct variables for n and
y that best describe actual rt over the sample period 1983Q1 to 2002Q2 for the U.S.
economy. We use data starting from 1983Q1 for a couple o f reasons. First, because
we are interested in understanding the behavior o f the Fed Funds rate and not some
other monetary targets, it is plausible to avoid the 1979-82 period where the Fed
targeted the non-borrowed reserves. Moreover, this has become a standard practice in
the literature. Secondly, we want to see how our results compare with those of
previous studies, including Kozicki (1999). We use five different inflation measures
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and four different output gap measures and this implies that the

20

rival models are

non-nested.
The five measures of inflation are CPI, Core CPI, Taylor’s GDP price
inflation, University o f Michigan expected inflation, and Philadelphia Fed expected
inflation. CPI inflation is measured as the percent change in the consumer price index
over the previous four quarters. Core CPI inflation is measured as the percent change
in the consumer price index excluding food and energy over the previous four
quarters. Taylor’s GDP price inflation, which the Taylor rule uses, is calculated as the
percent change in the GDP price deflator over the previous four quarters. The
University o f Michigan expected inflation, calculated by the Survey o f Consumers as
the median expected price change over the next 12 months, is obtainable from the St.
Louis Fed database and then converted to quarterly frequency. The Philadelphia Fed
measure of inflation is the one-year ahead average inflation forecast for chainweighted GDP price index as reported by the Survey o f Professional Forecasters.
These five measures comprise o f both backward-looking as well as forwardlooking measures. CPI, core CPI and Taylor’s GDP price inflation are backwardlooking in that they describe inflation over a time period that has already past. On the
other hand, the University of Michigan expected inflation and the Philadelphia Fed
expected inflation are forward-looking in that they describe inflation as it is expected
to be over a future time period. The huge debate about whether Taylor rules are or
should be backward-looking or forward-looking is a rationale for including both types
o f inflation measures in the analysis. Svensson (2003), Svensson and Woodford
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(2003), Hansen and Sargent (2003), Batini and Haldane (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2000), Woodford (2000), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998), and Orphanides (1997)
provide a good discussion on backward-looking and forward-looking rules. Using
these inflation measures, the inflation gaps are then constructed as the deviations of
these measures o f inflation from a 2 percent target level.
The four measures o f output gap differ according to the estimates o f the
potential output (that is, its long-run sustainable trend). Potential real GDP is a
theoretical construct and there are various approaches to estimate it. We use four
measures o f potential real GDP: Congressional Budget Office (CBO), HodrickPrescott filter trend, Taylor’s linear time trend, and International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The CBO potential real GDP was obtainable from the CBO. It is calculated
using a neoclassical production function (see Arnold, 1995). The Hodrick-Prescott
filter trend is estimated with a smoothing parameter o f 1600 given the quarterly nature
o f our data. Taylor’s measure o f potential GDP is calculated as the fitted values from
a regression o f the natural logarithm o f real GDP on a constant and time trend. The
IMF potential output series was interpolated from an annual potential output series
constructed by the IMF using a segmented trend approach. This approach assumes
that the rate o f growth o f potential output changes at specific structural points, but is
constant between these points (see De Masi, 1997).
The output gap is constructed as the difference between real GDP and
potential real GDP expressed as a percentage o f potential real GDP. Different
measures o f the output gap are considered because policymakers often recognize that
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there are difficulties in assessing the output gap, and assuming one measure o f output
gap over another can mislead policy that attempts to judge inflationary risks in the
economy. A case in point is Governor Gramlich’s (1998) comment: “For the Fed to
lean against the wind o f output gaps, it has to know what the output gaps are, and that
too can become quite tricky as unemployment approaches its desired level.”
Identifying which of these measures o f inflation and output gaps enter the
Taylor-type monetary policy rules eventually boils down to: which Fed Funds rate
model is data congruent? That is, which model is the appropriate characterization of
the Fed Funds rate data generating process? The problem becomes more complex
when rival models are non-nested. Two models are said to be non-nested if either
model cannot be expressed as a restricted version o f the other. In this study, we use
the idea o f the encompassing principle o f Mizon and Richard (1986) to pin down a
data congruent model for the Fed Funds rate when non-nested competing alternatives
exist. We use a Taylor-type monetary policy rule setting as the underlying model
framework.
One complication o f Taylor-type rules is that they tend to be non-linear
because o f lagged dependent variables (usually from the interest-rate smoothing
behavior) and the possible existence o f serial correlation in the disturbance term.
Testing non-nested nonlinear models can be traced back to Pesaran and Deaton
(1978), based on the earlier work o f Cox (1961, 1962) and Pesaran (1974). Pesaran
(1974) derives a test o f a linear regression model against a non-nested linear
alternative when the regressors o f both models are non-stochastic and the errors
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follow a stationary first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process. The approach relies on
Cox’s (1961, 1962) method for testing separate families o f hypotheses. Davidson and
MacKinnon (1981, 1993) clarify the use o f different tests depending on whether the
null (the maintained model) is linear or nonlinear. They recommend using the J test
when the null is linear. However, McAleer, Pesaran and Bera (1990) argue that a
direct extension o f the J test procedure to models with serial correlation is not valid.
In the case o f a non-linear null with serial correlation, the P test o f Davidson and
MacKinnon (1981) is recommended. The Cox test o f Pesaran and Deaton (1978) and
the P test are asymptotically equivalent under the null. In our study, we use the
multivariate version o f the P test o f Davidson and MacKinnon (1981). In a Taylortype rule setting, the test is constructed as follows. First, we substitute (11)into

(10)

and rearrange terms to get
( 12)

Tt

=

P ° T ,~l +
~ A>r'~2
+ (y, - p 0y , - M + s t-

+ ® ~ Po

^

+^

This equation is nonlinear and the J test is not valid. To construct the P test, Davidson
and MacKinnon (1981) and McAleer, Pesaran and Bera (1990) recommend
linearizing the J test regression and calculating the following partial derivatives
dr
(13)

~Qpi = ^ t_1 ~~Port-2> 1 —Po>

~ / W i ’ Tr —PoTr-i)

= rt_x - P0rt__2 - p x - p 2n t_x - fi3y t_x

(14)
dPo

The P test is then the t-test o f A = 0 in the linear regression
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where rt and r* are the predictions o f the Fed Funds rate under the null and the
alternative non-nested model respectively and v t is gaussian white noise. In essence,
the difference in (15) represents the prediction errors under the two competing
hypotheses. To get the parameter estimates in (12) the maximum likelihood
estimation technique is used, whereas least squares suffice to estimate equation (15).

Estimated Reaction Functions and Non-Nested P Test Results

In this section we report the results o f the non-nested P test as given by
equation (15). Before conducting the non-nested tests, however, we also report the
results o f the estimated reaction functions in Table 1. The results appear to be
consistent with the literature. The general pattern is that the policy rule tends to give
more weight to inflation than to the output gap. This is particularly true when
inflation is measured as GDP price inflation or expected inflation. There is also a
substantial degree o f policy inertia as evidenced by the interest rate smoothing
parameter. Such results are standard in the literature. When core CPI measure o f
inflation is used, it sometimes appear not to be significant in the policy rule, and also
the fit is relatively not good as the standard error o f the regression is highest in such
models.
Together with the estimated Taylor rules and the non-nested tests, a total o f
136 regressions is estimated. The methodology we adopt to identify the data
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congruent model falls in two parts. The first part is to pin down the correct inflation
measure. The second part is to pin down the output measure. The first part consists o f

Table 1
Estimated Reaction Functions
Output

Inflation

A

A

A

A

CBO

CPI

CBO

CORE

CBO

DEF

CBO

UMICH

CBO

FED

0.44**
(4.11)
0.48**
(4.34)
0.43**
(4.06)
0.51**
(5.10)
0 .6 6 **
(10.05)

2.58**
(3.53)
2.36**
(3.41)
2.84**
(4.44)
2.15**
(3.20)
1.18**
(3.70)

0.25*
(2.23)
0.23
(1.07)
0.72**
(3.42)
0.31*
(2.48)
0.83**
(6.08)

0.34**
(3.49)
0.36**
(3.59)
0.40**
(4.23)
0.33**
(3.44)
0.27**
(4.78)

HP

CPI
CORE

HP

DEF

HP

UMICH

HP

FED

2.42**
(3.73)
1.92**
(2.73)
2.51**
(3.73)
1.33*
(2.27)
1.48**
(3.49)

0.23*
(2 .0 2 )

HP

0.50**
(4.12)
0.60**
(4.36)
0.50**
(4.01)
0 .6 8 **
(6.89)
0.62**
(7.51)

(1.03)
0.65**
(3.18)
0.36**
(2.69)
0.62**
(4.41)

0.38**
(3.54)
0.41**
(3.79)
0.43**
(4.24)
0.38**
(3.67)
0.38**
(4.07)

( 1 1 .2 0 )
0.79**
(7.27)
0.81**
(8.34)
0.71**
(6.43)
0.62**
(5.28)

TAYLOR

CPI

TAYLOR

CORE

TAYLOR

DEF

TAYLOR

UMICH

TAYLOR

FED

0.47**
(4.10)
0.53**
(4.18)
0.43**
(3.74)
0.56**
(5.35)
0.48**
(4.67)

3.06**
(4.66)
2.84**
(4.13)
3.32**
(4.98)
2.48**
(3.80)
2.61**
(4.25)

0.23*
(1.99)
0.13
(0.65)
0.59**
(2.75)
0.33*
(2.57)
0.61**
(3.63)

0.34**
(4.13)
0.35**
(4.10)
0.36**
(4.40)
0.32**
(4.01)
0.29**
(3.62)

0.81**
(10.41)
0.80**
(9.37)
0.83**
(10.25)
0.77**
(9.05)
0.77**
(7.98)

0 .2 0

Po
0.91**
(2 0 .2 0 )
0.90**
(17.18)
0 .8 8 **
(16.06)
0.90**
(18.33)
0.48**
(4.09)
0 .8 6 **
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a
0.44
0.45
0.42
0.44
0.39

0.44
0.45
0.42
0.43
0.40

0.43
0.44
0.42
0.42
0.40
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Table 1-Continued
Output

Inflation

A

IMF

CPI

IMF

CORE

0.39**
(3.42)
0.46**
(3.69)
0.39**
(3.36)
0.49**
(4.31)
0.65**
(7.03)

IMF

DEF

IMF

UMICH

IMF

FED

fix
2.56*
(2.62)
2.33*
(2.51)
2.84**
(3.39)
2.13*
(2.57)
1.28**
(2.75)

A

A

0.29*
(2.47)

0.34*
(2.33)
0.33*
(2.17)
0.40**
(2.72)
0.29
(1.96)
0.16*
(2.30)

0 .2 0

(0.84)
0 .6 8 **
(2.98)
0.32*
(2.42)
0.75**
(4.40)

Po
0.93**
(20.25)
0.92**
(17.35)
0.92**
(16.86)
0.92**
(17.63)
0.60**
(4.62)

a
0.46
0.47
0.45
0.46
0.43

Note: The first column represents the output gap measures: CBO=CBO output gap,
HP=Hodrick-Prescott Trend Filter output gap, TAYLOR=Taylor’s Linear Time Trend
output gap, IMF=IMF’s output gap. The second column represents the inflation gap
measures: CPI=CPI Inflation, CORE=Core CPI Inflation, DEF=GDP Price Inflation,
UMICH=University o f Michigan Expected Inflation, FED=Philadelphia Fed Expected
Inflation, po represent AR(1) errors, a represents the standard error o f the regression,
t-statistics, are shown in parentheses, ** and * denote significant at the 1 and 5
percent levels respectively.

picking any one measure o f output gap among the four measures and use the five
different inflation measures each alternatively to estimate non-nested Taylor-type
rules. We then perform the non-nested pair-wise P test as well as the joint test. The
null hypothesis in the pair-wise test consists o f testing one measure o f inflation
against another measure o f inflation for a given output gap measure whereas the null
hypothesis in the joint test consists o f testing one measure of inflation against all the
other measures of inflation for a given output gap measure. Then the procedure is
repeated for each o f the other three output gap measures. The objective is to pin down
the correct inflation measure(s) for each output gap measure. For any single one
output gap measure and five inflation measures this means there are 20 pair-wise P
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tests (as this involves the reverse P test also) and 5 joint P tests. This makes a total o f
100 non-nested P tests for the four output gap measures and the five inflation
measures we have. Furthermore, with five inflation measures, we have 5 own
regressions for each output gap measure. Thus, the number o f estimated regressions to
pin down the correct inflation measure totals

120.

Table 2 shows the results o f the P tests for different measures o f inflation
against the CBO measure o f output gap, the Hodrick-Prescott Trend measure of
output gap, Taylor’s linear time trend measure o f output gap and the IMF’s measure
o f output gap respectively. One important result from table 2 is that there is strong
evidence to suggest that the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation is the
most robust measure o f inflation for policy rule specification. Rule recommendations
based on this measure o f inflation most closely and most appropriately describe the
behavior o f the Fed Funds rate. This result is strikingly clear and unambiguous and
holds irrespective o f which measure o f output gap is used. The GDP price inflation
which is usually used in the literature on policy rules gets rejected consistently almost
everywhere against the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure, and this calls for
attention that using the GDP price inflation measure in policy rules would lead to a
misspecification bias.
In Panel A, the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation cannot be
rejected in pair-wise tests against any o f the other inflation measures except in the one
case o f GDP price inflation. It cannot also be jointly rejected against all o f the other
measures o f inflation, the joint Wald test statistic being 1.39 and insignificant.
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Table 2
Non-Nested P Tests to Identify the Inflation Measure

Panel

A

B

C

D

Output
CBO
CBO
CBO
CBO
CBO

Null
Inflation
CPI
CORE
DEF
UMICH
FED

CPI
0.44
1.95
0.46
1.46
1.38

Alternative Hypotheses
CORE DEF
UMICH
2.50** 1.75
0.09
3.24** 2.42**
0.45
0.42
-0.37
1.73
1 .0 0
2.84** 0.44
1.30
2 .2 0 **
1.69

HP
HP
HP
HP
HP

CPI
CORE
DEF
UMICH
FED

0.44
1.75
0.16
1.13
0.28

0.23
0.45
-0.85
1.08
-0.67

2.51**
3.18**
0.42
2.59**
1.37

2.16**
2.63**

TAYLOR
TAYLOR
TAYLOR
TAYLOR
TAYLOR

CPI
CORE
DEF
UMICH
FED

0.43
1.90
0.42
1.06
0.89

-0.24
0.43
-1.14
0.64
-0 .2 1

2.08**
2.99**
0.42
2.29**
1.74

1.89
2.53**
1.73
0.42

IMF
IMF
IMF
IMF
IMF

CPI
CORE
DEF
UMICH
FED

0.46
2.31**

-0.19
0.47
-0.45
0.82
1.24

1.87
2.87**
0.45
2.42**
2.45**

1.59
2.37**
1.72
0.46
1.51

1 .0 2

1.69
1.69

1 .6 8

0.43
0.82

1 .0 2

FED
4.66**
5.21**
4.15**
4.54**
0.39

Joint
Test
F
6.39**
7.69**
4.65**
5 9 9 **
1.39
498**

3.90**
4.43**
3.38**
3.55**
0.40

6.05**
3.49**
4.20**
0.99

3.19**
3.72**
2.94**
2.83**
0.40

3.65**
4.75**
2.55**
3.03**
1.08

3.70**
4.33**
3 7i**

4.26**
5.87**
3.61**
4.31**
1.58

3.66**
0.43

Note: The first column represents the output gap measures: CBO=CBO output gap,
HP=Hodrick-Prescott Trend Filter output gap, TAYLOR=Taylor’s Linear Time Trend
output gap, IMF=IMF’s output gap. The second column represents the null
hypotheses for the different inflation gap measures: CPI=CPI Inflation, CORE=Core
CPI Inflation, DEF=GDP Price Inflation, UMICH=University o f Michigan Expected
Inflation, FED=Philadelphia Fed Expected Inflation. The alternative hypotheses are
given in columns 3 to 7. Numbers in the last column are the Joint tests results, off
diagonal cells represent t-statistics, diagonal cells represent the standard error o f the
regression, and ** denotes significant at the 1 percent level.
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In practical terms, this means that the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation
encompasses the other inflation measures. That is, it appropriately characterizes the
Fed Funds rate data generating process in a Taylor-type setting while the other
inflation measures add no extra value. The CPI inflation measure is rejected against
GDP price inflation as well as the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation.
The GDP price inflation is rejected against only the Philadelphia Fed expected
inflation measure in the pair-wise test, but rejected in the joint test. The University of
Michigan expected inflation measure is rejected against both the GDP price inflation
and the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measures. The core CPI inflation seems to
be the worst measure o f inflation in the monetary policy rule setting as it is rejected
against all but one o f the other inflation measures. Similar results for the joint tests
carry through Panels B to D.
Panel B shows the results o f the P tests in a similar spirit as in Panel A. Here,
the Taylor-type rules have been estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter trend
measure o f the output gap. Again, the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure
cannot be rejected against any o f the other inflation measures either in a pair-wise
fashion or jointly. The CPI, the core CPI inflation and the University o f Michigan
expected inflation measures are rejected against most o f the other inflation measures.
The GDP price inflation, however, is rejected only against the Philadelphia Fed
expected inflation measure in the pair-wise P test. The results in Panel C where the
Taylor-type rules are estimated using the Taylor’s linear time trend measure o f output
gap follow very closely the pattern in Panel B. The Philadelphia Fed expected
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inflation measure is the most robust measure o f inflation. When the IMF measure o f
output gap is used as shown in Panel D, the core CPI is rejected against all o f the
other inflation measures. The CPI and the GDP price inflation are rejected against
only the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure. The result that the Philadelphia
Fed inflation measure is still robust is maintained here also.
Besides the fact that the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure shows
up as an outstanding inflation measure for policy rules, there is also evidence from the
four panels that irrespective o f the output gap measures used, the core CPI inflation as
a measure o f inflation for rule recommendations seems to be the worst measure: it is
rejected by almost all other measures o f inflation in a pair-wise fashion as well as
jointly.
Once having pinned down the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure as
the inflation measure which is consistent with the interest rate data generating
process, we go on to the second part to pin down the correct output gap measure(s).
Using the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure, we now estimate non-nested
Taylor rules with varying output gap measures. With four output gap measures, this
means we have to perform 12 pair-wise and 4 joint P tests, making a total o f 16 non
nested P tests.
Table 3 shows the results o f Taylor rules-based P test for different measures o f
output gap against the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure.
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Table 3
Non-Nested P Tests to Identify the Output Gap Measure
Null
Hypotheses
CBO
HP
TAYLOR
IMF

CBO
0.39
1.84
2.62**
4.06**

Alternative
HP
0.48
0.40
1 .6 6

3.35**

Hypotheses
TAYLOR
0.34
0.79
0.40
2.96**

Joint
Test
IMF
- 1 .8 6
0.46
0.09
0.43

1.56
2.36+
2.72**
5.53**

Note: This table conditions on the fact that the inflation measure is the
Philadelphia Fed expected inflation identified in table 2. The first column
represents the null hypotheses for the different output gap measures:
CBO=CBO output gap, HPHHodrick-Prescott Trend Filter output gap,
TAYLOR=Taylor’s Linear Time Trend output gap, IMF=IMF’s output
gap. Numbers in the last column are the Joint tests, off diagonal cells
represent t-statistics, diagonal cells represent the standard error o f the
regression, ** and + denote significant at the 1 percent and 8 percent
levels respectively.

The results are again strong and unambiguous: the CBO output gap measure
cannot be rejected against any o f the other measures o f output gap either in a pair
wise fashion or jointly. This means that the CBO measure of output gap encompasses
the other output gap measures. However, there is slight evidence that the HodrickPrescott Trend measure o f output gap can be at best only a weak proxy for the output
gap in rule recommendations: it cannot be rejected until the

8

percent level o f

significance. Taylor’s linear time trend measure and the IMF’s measure o f output gap
are strongly rejected, with the IM F’s measure being the worst measure o f output gap
to be used in rule recommendations.
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Conclusion

This paper has focused on identifying a monetary policy rule that most
appropriately describes the Fed Funds rate data generating process. We have used a
class o f non-nested Taylor-type rules, employed the encompassing principle and
performed 116 non-nested P tests to examine their data congruency. O f the various
backward-looking and forward-looking measures o f inflation and output gap that have
been traditionally claimed to be relevant for monetary policy design, our study shows
that only the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation as calculated by the
Survey o f Professional Forecasters and the CBO measure o f output gap are the
measures that produce the rule recommendations that are consistent with the actual
Fed Funds rate over the 1983Q1 to 2002Q2 period. This means that rule
recommendations based on these measures alone most closely mimic the actual Fed
Funds rate behavior. Moreover, Taylor-type rules estimated with these measures
encompass alternative models. This implies that the results are robust and the model
that uses the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation measure and the CBO output gap
measure is data congruent. The fact that the Philadelphia Fed measure o f inflation is
an expected measure this has implications for the debate about the forward-looking
behavior o f Taylor-type rules.
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PART IV

DOES THE FED REACT TO ASSET PRICES
WHILE DESIGNING MONETARY POLICY?

Introduction

The relationship between monetary policy and asset prices has received
increased attention over the past two decades. Two recent developments could
potentially change the way monetary policy has traditionally been viewed: one is
stock price volatility and the other is productivity gains. The bull market that began in
1983 (Balke and Wolhar, 2001) has led economists to ask whether fundamentals have
changed or the market is high only because o f some irrational exuberance as Federal
Reserve (Fed) Chairman Alan Greenspan noted in his December 1996 speech. A
change in market fundamentals in the form o f sustainable productivity gains has very
different implications from simply a transient misalignment o f asset prices. Moreover,
while volatility in part reflects the nature o f asset prices (driven primarily by revisions
in expectations o f future returns), large movements have important implications as
they pose a threat to price stability which is the overriding goal o f monetary policy.
If asset prices contain vital information about the economy the logical

question, therefore, is: Do asset prices influence the design of monetary policy? The
existing debate has revolved more around analyses o f monetary policy prescriptions
than realized monetary policy actions without giving enough emphasis to the latter.

37
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Should the Fed systematically react to asset price movements is indeed a different,
though not unrelated, question from does the Fed react to asset price movements?
There are episodes in history that suggest that the Fed did respond to asset prices. For
instance, the 1987 policy easing in response to the stock market crash and, more
recently, the series o f interest rate hikes that the Fed undertook as stock prices
escalated to unprecedented levels in the late 1990s. However, cases like these are
most often discussed as “discretionary” in the rules-versus-discretion debate. This
raises the issue o f what variables enter monetary policy rules in a dynamic and
continuously evolving financial and economic environment. To understand what
policy should be, it is important to first know what policy has been, so that mistakes
are not repeated as lessons are drawn. This paper is an attempt to shed light on these
issues by analyzing whether the monetary policy reacts to the stock market. In the
literature, when analyses o f stock markets and monetary policy have been undertaken,
adequate distinction has not been made between stock price bubbles, stock returns
volatility and stock market fundamentals. One contribution o f this study is to
highlight that these issues are indeed different and have different policy implications.
Since Taylor (1993), monetary policy has been modeled as interest rate
feedback rules or reaction functions whereby the Fed changes its policy instrument,
the nominal Federal Funds rate, in response to variables in the economy, in particular,
inflation and output variability. Difficulties in measuring money and finding a stable
money demand function are the reasons why interest rates are favored over the money
supply rule (Poole, 1970). Taylor (1993) argues that his simple rule is a good
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representation o f how the Fed sets its policy instrument. However, critics have shown
that the so-called Taylor rule misses out on the inertial behavior o f the Fed and this
has led to an enormous literature on optimal policy rules as opposed to simple policy
rules (Giannoni and Woodford, 2001). Yet, among the class o f optimal policy rules,
there is a division about how these rules are specified especially when it comes to the
possibility o f the Fed’s reaction to asset price movements.
A number o f authors have recently cautioned against the incorporation o f asset
prices in monetary policy feedback rules (Fuhrer and Moore (1992), Woodford
(1994), Bemanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), and Bullard and Schaling (2002)). Their
reasoning is that targeting asset prices have undesirable effects. Bemanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) argue that it is desirable for central banks to focus on underlying
inflationary pressures and asset prices become relevant only to the extent they may
signal potential inflationary or deflationary forces. They conclude that as long as
monetary policy responds aggressively to inflation, there is no rationale for a direct
response to asset prices. Bullard and Schaling (2002) show in a simple arbitrage
model that responding to equity prices results in indeterminacy o f rational
expectations equilibrium.

Fuhrer and Moore (1992) find that placing too much

weight on asset prices in the reaction function may lead to instability as policy loses
control o f inflation. Similarly, Woodford (1994) and Bemanke and Woodford (1997)
show that automatic monetary policy feedback from such indicators can create
instability due to self-fulfilling expectations.
However, some studies such as Kent and Lowe (1997), Smets (1997),
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Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Rigobon and Sack (2001), Becchetti and Mattesini
(2001) and Cecchetti et al (2000) support the idea that that central banks react to asset
price movements. Examples o f such studies are. The idea is that a central bank
concerned with stabilizing inflation about a specific target level is likely to achieve
superior performance by adjusting its policy instruments not only in response to its
forecast of future inflation and the output gap, but to asset prices as well. Cecchetti et
al (2000) reason that asset price bubbles create distortions in investment and
consumption, leading to extreme rises and then falls in both output and inflation.
Raising interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above what are estimated to be
warranted levels, and lowering interest rates modestly when asset prices fall below
warranted levels helps to smooth these fluctuations by reducing the possibility o f an
asset price bubble coming into existence in the first place. Kent and Lowe (1997)
argue that if the central bank can reduce the size o f the bubble by tightening policy
when the bubble is still in its formative stages, the imbalances created when it
eventually bursts will be mitigated. Becchetti and Mattessini (2001) construct an
Index o f Stock Price Misalignment based on a discounted cash flow model and show
that the Fed reacts to deviations from fundamental values by raising the Federal Funds
rate. Rigobon and Sack (2001) also find that the Fed reacts to changes in stock market
valuations when adjusting its instrument. Using a monetary model with flexible
nominal prices, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) show that to the extent that asset prices
do not immediately lead to price inflation, there is a welfare-improving role for a
monetary policy that responds actively to asset price and productivity shocks. Smets
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(1997) suggests that the optimal monetary response to unexpected changes in asset
prices depends on how these changes affect the central bank’s inflation forecast; if
they imply a rise in the inflation forecast, policy should be tightened and vice versa.
However, his evidence suggests that the Bank o f Canada responds to a rise in the
stock prices by lowering interest rates.
Overall, not only are there divergent views about whether monetary policy
reacts to asset prices, but also there is another dimension to the problem, namely how
to estimate asset price misalignments or gauge the amount o f volatility that asset price
movements contain? Another purpose o f this paper is to address these issue.
The contributions o f this study are, therefore, two-fold. First, this paper uses a
non-linear model o f intrinsic bubbles to isolate market fundamentals from asset price
misalignments. The estimated measures o f fundamental values o f stocks and asset
price bubbles are then used in an augmented Taylor rule to assess the Fed’s response.
As fundamental values are essentially driven by productivity, this paper also uses a
more direct measure o f productivity growth to assess the robustness o f the Fed’s
reaction. Productivity has surprisingly not been modeled explicitly in Taylor rules and
this paper shows that unlike standard variables that enter Taylor rules, productivity or
market fundamentals have very different implications for policy, as Koenig (2000)
would agree. Second, this paper provides an estimate o f asset returns volatility by
using an Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (EGARCH) model. The attractive feature o f this model is that it captures the
asymmetries - the leverage effects - that are inherent in the volatility o f stock returns.
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This estimated measure o f volatility is then also used as an additional variable in the
Taylor rule.

Measuring Stock Market Fundamentals, Bubbles and Volatility

Stock prices and returns have the inherent characteristic o f being volatile
partly because they are driven by frequent revisions in market expectations. However,
when volatility tends to be large there is a cause for concern and the question that
arises is: To what extent does movement in stock prices reflect changes in
fundamental values? The simple present value model, which states that real stock
prices depend linearly on real dividends, is clearly inadequate. Indeed, Shiller (1981)
shows that stock prices are too volatile to be explained by movements in dividends
alone. Barsky and De Long (1993) and Campbell and Shiller (1987) also support this
view that stock prices respond more than proportionately to movements in dividends.
This suggests that stock prices tend to have another component besides fundamental
values. In fact, West (1987) shows that the stock price equals the sum o f two
components: the price implied by the efficient markets model (Fama, 1970) and a
speculative bubble. According to Stiglitz (1990), a stock price bubble exists if the
reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling
price will be high tomorrow. Hence, bubbles represent price misalignments or
deviations o f stock market price from fundamental values.
Attempts to explain fundamental values can be traced back to Gordon (1962).
However, one o f the most influential works on stock market bubbles is that o f Froot
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and Obstfeld (1991). They develop a model o f intrinsic bubbles for stock prices.
Using this intrinsic bubble framework, we extract the fundamental value o f stocks and
a measure o f stock price misalignments that we use subsequently in this study.

Intrinsic Bubbles and Fundamental Values o f Stocks

According to Froot and Obstfeld (1991), an intrinsic bubble is a rational
bubble (defined below) that depends exclusively - albeit nonlinearly - on dividends.
It is called intrinsic because it derives all o f its variability from exogenous
fundamental determinants o f asset prices (that is dividends). One important feature of
intrinsic bubbles is that they are deterministic functions o f dividends alone. Thus this
class o f bubbles predicts that stable and highly persistent fundamentals lead to stable
and highly persistent over- or under-valuations. In addition, these bubbles can cause
asset prices to “overreact” to changes in fundamentals. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) start
out with a simple present value condition where the real stock price is equal to the
present discounted value o f real dividend payment plus the real stock price next
period:
(16)

Pt = e - rE t (Dt +PM )

where Pt is real price o f a share at the beginning o f period t, Dt is real dividends per
share paid out over period t, r is the constant real discount rate, and Et(.) is the
market’s expectation conditional on information known at the start o f period t. The
present value solution for Pt, denoted Ptpv, is

(

17

)

? r

=

£

e,

£ , ( £ > , ) .
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A rational bubble Bt is one that satisfies
(18)

Bt =e~rE t (Bt+l).

Then, equation (16) can be written as
(19)

Pt =PtPV+ B t

which can be thought o f as the sum o f the present-value solution and a rational
bubble. Rational bubbles are sometimes viewed as being driven by variables
extraneous to the valuation problem. However, Froot and Obstfeld (1991) argue that
some bubbles may depend only on the exogenous fundamental determinants o f asset
value. An intrinsic bubble is constructed by finding a nonlinear function o f
fundamentals that satisfies (18). For this, they assume that log dividends are generated
by the geometric martingale
( 20 )

d M = ^ + d d + £ +1

where u is the drift in dividends, dt is the log o f dividends at time t, and ^t+i is a
normal random variable with conditional mean zero and variance a 2. Using (20) and
assuming that period-t dividends are known when Pt is set, we see that the present
value stock price in (17) is directly proportional to dividends:
(21)

P,” =KDt

where k = \!{er - e 'u+CT /2).

Equation (21) is essentially a stochastic version of Gordon’s (1962) model of stock
prices, which predicts that Ptpv = Dt !{er - e M) under certainty. The assumption that
y

the sum in (17) converges implies that r > p + cr 12. Now, an intrinsic bubble is
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defined as
(22)

B(D t ) = cD?

where X is the positive root o f the quadratic equation X2a 2/2 + A41 - r = 0 , and c is an
arbitrary constant. By summing the present value price (21) and the bubble in (22), we
get our basic stock price equation:
(23)

P(D t) = Ptpv + B(D t) = kD, + cD? .

Equation (23) says that the price o f stocks has two components: the fundamental
value, which depends in linearly on dividends, and the intrinsic bubble which depends
on dividends in a nonlinear fashion. For c>0, stock prices will over-react to changes
in dividends:

(24)

^

dDt

=

k

+ A cD?~1 >

k

In order to estimate the fundamental value and the bubble component in (23), the
following statistical model is used
(25)

Pt = kD( + cD 2 + s t.

where et is the present value errors. Estimating equation (25) poses problem because
o f collinearity among the regressors. So, dividing equation (25) throughout by Dt
gives:

(26)

i

= v + c D « +I;,

where r|t=£t/Dt- In equation (26) focus is on intercept term

k

.

Once the value o f k is

obtained, the fundamental value o f stocks from equation (2 1 ) can be estimated as
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P pv - kD { . Then an estimate of the bubble would be B(D t) = Pt - Ptpv or c D f.
This study uses quarterly data from 1985:1 to 2001:3 for the U.S. economy.
All the data are in 1996 constant prices and seasonally adjusted, except for the interest
rate. Data on dividends and stock prices (Standard & Poor’s 500) are taken from
Shiller (2000). We have deflated them using the Consumer Price Index with 1996 as
the base year. These monthly data have been converted to quarterly data using normal
aggregation procedures. Stock returns are calculated as the log difference o f real stock
prices,
To estimate equation (26), the non-linear least squares method is employed.
The objective is to come up with an optimal value o f X-l that minimizes the sum of
squared residuals (SSR) from equation (26). This is done by using a grid search,
starting out with values o f X-l that Froot and Obstfeld computed (which is
approximately 3). However, because o f the non-linear property o f the equation,
convergence was the main problem that occurred. Moreover, in this study quarterly
data are used whereas they used annual data, and this created some technical issues
that need to be resolved by a grid search. Experiments are done with extreme values
for X-l ranging from 1 to 50 with increments o f 1 unit at a time. The criterion to
include incremental points is whether each increment is adding to the efficiency o f the
SSR. After pinning down the initial value o f X-l, equal to 13, which gives a local
minimum, a finer grid search with increments o f 0.1 unit is used. This is the second
round o f the grid search. The optimal X-l that is extracted turns out to be 12.70. The
results are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4
Grid Search for Optimal A.-1
First Round
SSR
X-l
9.00 11963.15
11458.28
1 0 .0 0
11.00 11134.78
10972.60
1 2 .0 0
13.00 10949.14
14.00 11043.43

Second Round
SSR
X-l
12.50 10899.41
12.60 10897.54
12.70 10896.93
12.80 10897.55
12.90 10899.38
13.00 10949.14

Note: SSR=sum o f squared residuals

Corresponding to this value o f A.-1, the estimate o f

k

is 25.48 and it is

significant with a t-ratio o f 38. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) estimated

k

to be 14. Their

estimate is lower than the one reported here and may be due to the fact that their
sample consists o f annual data for the 1900-1988 period only; this excludes the recent
periods o f asset price booms. Balke and Wolhar (2001) extracted a fundamental value
of 24.91 for a very long historical sample period (from 1881 to 1999), by using the
Gordon’s (1962) stock valuation model. For the 100-year period before 1983, they
extract a price-dividend ratio which is not very dissimilar.
Using the estimated

k

value o f 25.48, the fundamental value o f stocks is then

given by Ptpv = 25.48Dt . Figure 3 shows a plot o f the log of actual real stock prices
and the log o f the estimated fundamental value o f stocks. The striking feature in
Figure 3 is the huge bubble that occurred in the late 1990s: real stock prices are way
above their fundamental values. That stocks were over-valued in the 1990s is well
supported by our data.
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Figure 3. Log o f Real Stock Prices and Fundamental Values

The plot also shows the (recessionary) years around 1980 to be a period where
stocks were under-valued. It can be noticed that historically it appears that
fundamental values and asset prices tend to have a strong correlation until the early
1990s. Flowever, because o f frequent revisions in expectations, asset prices tend to
have a volatile component as well. In the 1990s asset prices have departed drastically
from fundamental values as we can see from Figure 3. The implication o f such a
misalignment or asset bubble is that if fundamental values tend to have the same
growth path, then it means that asset prices should revert back to it in the coming
years, all else constant. The bursting o f the bubble is indeed a cause for concern for
the Fed as these certainly have implications for price stability.
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Volatility o f Stock Returns

While many studies have recognized that volatility in asset prices or returns
are a cause for concern, none o f them has integrated a systematic measure o f volatility
into a monetary policy rule. In their study on monetary policy and asset price
volatility, Bernanke and Gertler (1999) model volatility as the once-lagged log level
o f the stock price relative to its steady-state value [log(Sn/S)]. In their empirical
model they use the log-differenced change in stock prices to capture this. While this is
traditionally used as a proxy for volatility, a more appropriate method o f measuring
volatility would be the Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic (E-GARCH) model proposed by Nelson (1991). The E-GARCH
model has the property that it can capture the asymmetries in volatility which are
typically observed in asset returns.
The E-GARCH model is an extension o f the ARCH model introduced by
Engle (1982) and generalized as GARCH (Generalized ARCH) by Bollerslev (1986).
In the standard GARCH(1,1) specification
(27)

y t =x , y + £t

(28)

erf = co + asf_x + f3crf_x

the mean equation given in (27) is written as a function o f exogenous variables, xt,
with an error term, et, which has conditional mean zero and variance erf given by
(28). Since erf is the one-period ahead forecast variance based on past information, it
represents the conditional variance. The conditional variance equation specified in
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(28) is a function o f three terms: the mean, co; news about volatility from the previous
period, measured as the lag o f the squared residual from the mean equation, s]_x (the
ARCH term), and the last period’s forecast variance, o]_x (the GARCH term).
However, for equities, it is often observed that downward movements in the
market are followed by higher volatilities than upward movements o f the same
magnitude - the so-called leverage effect. To account for this asymmetry, Nelson
(1991) proposed an E-GARCH model where the specification for the conditional
variance is:

(29)

log(cr( ) = co + p log(crM) + a

+

7

e t-1

° ,- x

Since the left-hand side is the log o f the conditional variance, this implies that the
leverage effect is exponential, rather than quadratic, and that forecasts o f the
conditional variance are guaranteed to be nonnegative. Leverage effect exists if y < 0.
The impact is asymmetric if y * 0.
Before equation (29) can be estimated, an AR process for the stock returns
(log differenced o f real stock prices) is fitted to make it stationary. Monthly stock
returns data o f the S&P500 index from 1955:01 to 2002:07 are used because we want
to capture the maximum information contained in the higher frequency data. The
results suggest that an AR(1) process adequately describes the data (the correlogram
and Q-statistics for lags up to 36 indicate no serial correlation). Then an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) process is estimated and the results are:
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(30)

log(o-,2) = -1.928 + 0.729 lo g to f.,) + 0.089

(0.375) (0.055)

(0.052)

St-1

- 0.261—

(0.047)

The figures in parentheses are the Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors. The
estimated value o f y (-0.261) is negative and significant at the

1

percent level,

indicating the existence o f the leverage effect in stock returns. Bad news (st-i/at-i<0)
and good news (st-i/at-i> 0 ) have differential impacts on the conditional variance - bad
news creating more volatility that good news. The estimated monthly conditional
variance series is then converted to a quarterly series using standard aggregation
method to match the frequency o f other variables in the estimated reaction functions.
This conditional variance series a t2 forms the basis o f our measure o f volatility of
stock returns used in the analysis o f monetary policy rules. Figure 4 shows the
volatility o f stock returns plot.
It can be noticed that stock market volatility displays a strong counter-cyclical
pattern - peaking just before or during recessions and falling sharply late in recessions
or early in recovery periods. Moreover, when volatility increases, investors require a
higher risk premium to hold stocks. As a result, stock prices fall. This is evident in the
1987 stock market crash, the 1990 Persian G ulf and S&L crises and recession, the
1994 Mexican Peso Crisis, the 1998 Russian Default and the 2001 recession.
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Figure 4. Volatility o f Stock Returns

The movement in volatility also appears to be persistent: once volatility rises,
it usually stays at high levels for a while. However, it shows no apparent long-run
trend. After declining in the early 1990s, volatility started to rise in 1996 and since
then has remained at remarkably high levels by postwar standards. As pointed out by
some authors in the literature, although unusual, the prolonged period o f high
volatility appears to be the result o f a string o f specific events. The East Asian crisis
and the Russian bond default ignited financial market turmoil in 1997 and 1998,
which persisted through 1999. Stock market volatility rose again in 2000 and 2001,
and stock prices fell, when analysts began to forecast an end to the long economic
expansion. Interestingly, the volatility o f the stock market took a large dip in the
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fourth quarter o f 2 0 0 1 .

Estimated Augmented Taylor Rules

Several reaction functions reported in Table 5 are estimated based on an
augmented Taylor rule using the following model specification:
(31)

it = r f + g n(n t -7z*) + g y ( yt) + g zz t

where z, contain the additional variables we include in the reaction function. The
Federal Funds rate (FFR) is the nominal interest rate aggregated from monthly data,
obtainable from the Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System. In a previous
study we showed that the appropriate measures o f inflation and output gap that enter
monetary policy rules are the Philadelphia Fed measure o f expected inflation and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) output gap. The Philadelphia Fed measure o f
expected inflation is the one-year ahead average inflation forecast for chain-weighted
GDP price index as reported by the Survey o f Professional Forecasters. The inflation
gap (INFLA) is the deviation o f this measure o f expected inflation from a target o f 2
percent. The output gap (YGAP) is the percentage deviation o f real GDP from
potential GDP where potential GDP is the CBO measure o f potential output. Data on
productivity (PROD) is the productivity index measured as output per hour o f all
persons from the Bureau o f Labor o f Statistics, U.S. Department o f Labor.

Productivity growth (PRODGR) is the log difference o f PROD. As the starting point,
we consider the case where the variable zt represents only the lagged Federal funds
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rate (FFR-1). This gives the regular augmented Taylor rule model with inertial
behavior. The results are shown in column (1) in Table 5.

Table 5
Estimated Augmented Taylor Rules

Models
INFLA
YGAP
FFR-1

( 1)
0.83**
(6.09)
0.27**
(4.78)
0 .6 6 **
(10.04)

YOL
BUB

Models
INFLA
YGAP
FFR-1

(5)
0.558**
(3.20)
0.335**
(5.03)
0.635**
(6.79)

VOL
BUB
FV25
PROGR

-2.893*
(-2.08)

Panel A
(2 )
(3)
0.329*
0.758**
(2.48)
(4.59)
0.387**
0.360**
(4.91)
(6.67)
0.689**
0.524**
( 1 0 .8 8 )
(5.45)
-0.137
(-1.61)
-0.005**
(-4.30)

Panel B
(6 )
(7)
0.339*
0.565**
(2.55)
(3.46)
0.389**
0.348**
( 6 .6 8 )
(5.35)
0.676**
0.640**
(10.37)
(7.55)
-0.155
(-1.61)
-0.004**
(-3.10)
-1.047
-2.970*
(-1.03)
(-2.46)

(4)
0.376**
(3.02)
0.417**
(7.42)
0.672**
(11.43)
-0.216*
(-2.29)
-0.005**
(-4.84)

(8 )
0.387**
(3.19)
0.420**
(7.63)
0.657**
(11.23)
-0.228*
(-2.44)
-0.004**
(-3.58)
-1.107
(-1.27)

(9)
0.376**
(2 .8 6 )
0.438**
(0.438)
0.657**
(10.24)
-0.196*
(-2 . 1 2 )
-0.005**
(-4.90)

-0.094+
(-1.78)

Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. +, * and ** denote
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels
respectively. Regressions have been corrected for first order
serial correlation.
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As it can be seen, all the coefficients are highly significant and have the
expected signs. Rudebusch (2002) shows that by using an interest rate smoothing rule
o f the following type
(32)

it

=

(1 - p ) ( g Kx t

+

g yy t ) + p i, _ ,

we can extract the gn and gy coefficients. Column (1) in Table 5 indeed implies that
(33)

it = (0.34X^71-, + g yy t) + 0.6 6it_x

so that g n = 2.44 and g y = 0.79. This result accords with the standard literature that
the Fed should respond to inflation by increasing interest rate by a more than one-toone ratio for policy to be stabilizing (Taylor, 1999). A coefficient o f more than 1.3 is
usually considered aggressive.
As far as stock returns in reaction functions are concerned, Bemanke and Gertler
(1999) argue that there are two ways to interpret them. The first is to interpret them as
literally saying that monetary policy is reacting directly to stock prices, as well as to
the output gap and expected inflation. The second is to treat the addition o f stock
returns as a general specification test that reveals whether monetary policy is pursuing
other objectives besides stabilization o f output and expected inflation. To the extent
that policy has other objectives, and there is information about these objectives in the
stock market, then we would expect to see stock returns enter the central bank’s
reaction function with a statistically significant coefficient.
Column (2) in Panel A o f Table 5 shows that the bubble term (BUB), calculated
as the percentage deviation o f real stock prices from fundamental values estimated
earlier, is statistically significant. However, this result has to be interpreted with
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caution as some elements o f fundamentals might be present in the bubble measure
which is essentially an intrinsic bubble driven by dividends. Moreover, the magnitude
o f the coefficient is very small that its economic significance from a policy
perspective is not fully warranted. Bemanke and Gertler (1999) found a negative but
insignificant coefficient for their measure o f asset price bubbles and they claim that
the Fed does not and should not react to stock returns unless these signal potentially
inflationary or deflationary pressures. The notion that the Fed attempts to burst a
bubble by raising rates when a bubble appears does not seem to be supported by the
data.
To see how the Fed responds to asset price volatility, the measure o f volatility
from the E-GARCH model estimated earlier (VOL) is used as an additional variable
in the Taylor rule. The results show that the VOL variable in column (3) is negative
but statistically insignificant. However when both volatility and asset bubbles are
included in the reaction function they turn out to be highly significant as shown in
column (4). Various specifications are estimated by using some o f the variables in
combination with others and some alone as regressors. The aim is to maintain the goal
o f parsimony.
In column ( 8 ) and (9) when other regressors are included as well, the volatility
variable enters significantly and negatively. This suggests that the Fed lowers interest
rate in response to a rise in volatility in asset returns. The argument that can be made
here is that a rise in volatility creates unstable economic environment as the level o f
uncertainty rises and businesses and firms lose confidence in economic activity. In
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order to establish confidence back in the markets, the Fed follows an expansionary
policy by lowering rates. This potentially boots consumption and investment and
general economic activity. Such a policy was evident in the 1987 stock market crash
and the 2001 contraction. On the other hand, suppose initially there was a reduction in
volatility. This means that investors require a lower risk premium to hold stocks, so
stock prices rise. If this rise in stock prices signals a recovery which can lead to
wealth effects and inflationary pressures, the Fed might be tightening policy. The
results contrast with Cecchetti et al (2000) who argue that the Fed should raise rates
in response to asset price misalignments and volatility.
In columns (5) to ( 8 ) in Panel B the fundamental value o f assets (FV25) in
conjunction with the volatility (VOL) variable or alone are used as regressors in the
Fed’s reaction function to see how the Fed reacts to a change in market fundamentals
in the presence and absence o f volatility. On balance, both turn out to be negative and
significant. Indeed, a rise in the fundamental value o f stocks is due to higher dividend
growth and higher productivity which means lower inflationary pressures. Hence, the
Fed accommodates or eases on policy when market fundamentals are going up. In
column (9) a more direct measure o f productivity is used. The results show that there
is some evidence that the Fed lowers interest rate in response to an increase in
productivity growth.
In his theoretical model, Smets (1997) agrees with Bemanke and Gertler (1999)
that the central bank’s response to unexpected changes in asset prices should depend
on how these changes affect the inflation outlook. If they imply a rise in the inflation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

forecast, both o f these models argue that policy should be tightened and vice versa.
However, empirically, Smets (1997) finds that the Bank of Canada eased policy in
response to an increase in stock prices. He argues that this can be rationalized if a rise
in the stock market reflects positive supply developments which expand output and
reduce inflation. He also notes, however, that this could be more o f an econometric
issue. In particular, he says that the central bank and the stock market could respond
to news about underlying inflation that is not captured by the instrument set he used.

Conclusion

This paper has examined how the Fed actually sets its interest rate rule in an
environment where stock market volatility and productivity pose an additional
concern to policy makers in formulating monetary policy. Indeed, the U.S. economy
has experienced a long boom over the past decade and asset prices have escalated to
unprecedented levels beginning with the 1983 bull market. These two phenomena
make it difficult to clearly isolate stock price bubbles from fundamental values.
Without properly identifying each, central bankers will always have a tough time
designing optimal monetary policy.
This paper makes a contribution toward this goal. To disentangle irrational
exuberance (asset bubbles) from market fundamentals, we use a non-linear model o f
intrinsic bubbles. Unlike previous studies that use simple proxies for asset price
movements, this paper employs a more systematic way to estimate asset price
misalignments and fundamental values. Moreover, to explicitly model the volatility in
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stock returns, this paper uses an Exponential GARCH model. This model has the
property that it can capture volatility asymmetries or leverage effects which are a
prominent feature o f stock returns.
These estimated measures o f market fundamentals, stock price bubbles and
stock returns volatility are then used as additional indicator variables in the Fed’s
reaction functions. The results suggest that asset price bubbles enter the reaction
function with a negative and statistically significant coefficient. However, this result
has to be interpreted with caution as some elements o f fundamentals might be present
in the bubble measure which is essentially an intrinsic bubble driven by dividends.
Moreover, the magnitude o f the coefficient is too small that its economic significance
from a policy perspective is not fully warranted. One important result o f the study is
that the Fed is seen to accommodate productivity growth and market fundamentals by
lowering interest rates. This is indeed an appealing result as existing Taylor rules in
the literature are essentially counter-cyclical while this study shows that this ought not
be the case. A rise in the fundamental value o f stocks is certainly because o f strong
productivity gains which translate into low future inflationary pressures on the
economy and thus the Fed engaging in an expansionary monetary policy seems to be a
justifiable action.
In response to an increase in volatility in stock returns, the Fed seems to lower
interest rates. The argument is two fold. First, because an increase in volatility brings
about a higher level o f uncertainty, the Fed eases on policy to restore confidence back.
Such a policy was evident in the 1987 stock market crash and the 2001 market dip.
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Second, by lowering rates, the Fed injects liquidity in the market and provides
environment that is conducive to investment and growth.
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PARTY

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation presents three essays to analyze a class o f Taylor-based
monetary policy rules that forms the basis o f contemporary monetary policy decisions.
The first essay examines whether Taylor-based monetary policy rules are forwardlooking. Unlike previous studies that investigate the forward- or backwardlookingness o f policy rules based solely on statistical break tests, this study uses the
superexogeneity test and invokes the Lucas critique to help solve the debate. It adopts
the methodology that, if the parameters o f the Taylor-type rule change when the
mechanism generating inflation changes, that is the Lucas critique applies, then
inflation is not superexogenous for the parameters o f the Taylor rule. In this case
where superexogeneity fails, the rule is forward-looking. The analysis is conducted by
first estimating a marginal model o f the Phillips curve. To capture structural breaks in
the inflation process, it uses a heteroskedastic variance model with discrete regime
shifts that explains the volatility o f inflation. However, although the results indicate
that the volatility o f inflation reduced by almost 50 percent over the second half o f the
sample period, we fail to reject the null that inflation is superexogenous to the

parameters of the Taylor rule. We fail to reject the null of weak exogeneity, parameter
constancy and structural invariance. Overall, there is no sufficient evidence to reject
the claim that Taylor-based rules are not forward-looking. If Taylor rules are forward-
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looking, it implies that monetary policymakers cannot change the process that
determines inflation without affecting the process that determines the Fed Funds rate.
Since superexogeneity tests lack power, the second essay uses a more direct
approach to assess which measures o f inflation and output are consistent with the Fed
Funds rate behavior. The objective is to identify a Taylor-based monetary policy rule
that most appropriately characterizes the Fed Funds rate data generating process. The
analysis is done for a class o f non-nested or rival Taylor rules. The study uses the
encompassing principle and performs 116 non-nested P tests to examine their data
congruency. O f the various measures o f inflation and output gaps that have been
traditionally claimed to be relevant for monetary policy design, this study
unambiguously comes up with one single measure o f inflation and output gaps that
best describe the Fed Funds rate behavior. These are the Philadelphia Fed measure of
expected inflation as calculated by the Survey o f Professional Forecasters and the
Congressional Budget Office measure o f output gap. Rule recommendations based on
these measures alone are consistent with the actual Fed Funds rate over the 1983Q1 to
2002Q2 period. This model is robust and encompasses all other alternative models.
This suggests that the model that uses the Philadelphia Fed expected inflation
measure and the CBO output gap measure is data congruent.
The third essay uses the results o f the second essay to examine how the Fed
actually sets its interest rate rule in an environment where stock market volatility and
productivity pose an additional concern. Since the U.S. economy has experienced a
long boom over the past decade and asset prices have escalated to unprecedented
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levels, these two phenomena make it difficult to clearly isolate stock price bubbles
from fundamental values. This essay notes that without properly identifying each,
central bankers will always have a tough time designing optimal monetary policy. To
disentangle irrational exuberance (asset bubbles) from market fundamentals, the study
uses a non-linear model o f intrinsic bubbles. Unlike previous studies that use simple
proxies for asset price movements, this paper employs a more systematic way to
estimate asset price misalignments and fundamental values. Moreover, to capture
volatility asymmetries or leverage effects which are a prominent feature o f stock
returns, the study employs an Exponential GARCH model. These estimated measures
of market fundamentals, stock price bubbles and stock returns volatility are then used
as additional indicator variables in the Fed’s reaction functions. The results indicate
that the Fed lowers interest rates in response to an increase in stock market volatility.
The rationale is that, because an increase in volatility brings about a higher level o f
uncertainty, the Fed eases on policy to restore confidence back in markets. By
lowering rates, the Fed injects liquidity in the market and provides an environment
that is conducive to investment and growth. The study also finds evidence that the Fed
tends to accommodate productivity gains: it lowers interest rates in response to an
increase in productivity growth and an improvement in market fundamentals. This is
indeed an appealing result as existing Taylor rules in the literature are essentially
counter-cyclical while this study shows that this counter-cyclicality can be dampened
when productivity measures are taken into account. A rise in the fundamental values
o f stocks is certainly because o f strong productivity gains which translate into low
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future inflationary pressures on the economy and thus the Fed conducting an
expansionary monetary policy seems to be a justifiable action. Finally, the study finds
that the magnitude o f the coefficient o f the stock price bubble in the Taylor rule is too
small that its economic significance from a policy perspective is not fully warranted.
Hence, it can be safely concluded that there is no strong evidence that the Fed
responds to asset price bubbles.
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